APPENDIX A

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-55294
D.C. No. CV-03-00386-GLT

Filed July 2, 2008

CENTER FOR BIO-ETHICAL REFORM, INC.; PAUL KULAS; THOMAS PADBERG,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF DEPARTMENT; LEROY D. BACA, in his official capacity as Sheriff; XAVIER R. AGUILAR, individually; XAVIER R. AGUILAR, in his official capacity as Sergeant; DAVE DESPOT, individually; DAVE DESPOT, in his official capacity as Deputy; MARK DARLING, individually; MARK DARLING, in his official capacity as Deputy; MARK C. REPCIK, individually; MARK C. REPCIK, in his official capacity as

OPINION

Deputy; ART ROBERTS, individually; ART ROBERTS, in his official capacity as an administrative official, Dodson Middle School,
Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Gary L. Taylor, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted
February 12, 2007—Pasadena, California

Before: Harry Pregerson, William A. Fletcher, and Marsha S. Berzon, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Pregerson

COUNSEL

Robert J. Muise (argued), Thomas More Law Center, Ann Arbor, Michigan; James A. Hayes, Cummins & White LLP, Newport Beach, California, for the plaintiffs-appellants.

Jennifer A.D. Lehman (argued), Deputy County Counsel, Raymond G. Fortner, County Counsel, Los Angeles, California, for defendants-appellees Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department.

Julie Mullane (argued), Gary Robert Gibeaut, Nancy Mahan-Lamb, Lisa J. Brown, Gibeaut, Mahan &

Briscoe, Los Angeles, California, for defendant-appellee Art Roberts.

OPINION

PREGERSON, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiffs drove a truck that displayed enlarged, graphic photographs of early-term aborted fetuses around the perimeter of a public middle school in Rancho Palos Verdes, California. Deputy Sheriffs were dispatched to the school. Plaintiffs contend that the officers violated their First Amendment rights by ordering Plaintiffs to remove their truck from an area adjacent to the school. Plaintiffs also contend that the officers violated their Fourth Amendment rights by detaining Plaintiffs for an unreasonable time and by searching their vehicle without consent.

Plaintiffs brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking damages and injunctive and declaratory relief for violation of their First and Fourth Amendment rights. The district court held that the Deputy Sheriffs and Dodson Middle School Assistant Principal Art Roberts were entitled to qualified immunity and dismissed the damages claims against them. In addition, the court dismissed the lawsuit against Los Angeles County Sheriff Leroy D. Baca, a redundant defendant. After considering cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on the remaining First and Fourth Amendment claims. Plaintiffs timely appealed these orders.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the district court's orders (1) granting Defendants' summary judgment motion on all the issues in the case, and (2) denying Plaintiffs' summary judgment motion with respect to Plaintiffs' First Amendment claim and Fourth Amendment Claim for unreasonable detention. We affirm the district court's order (1) dismissing Sheriff Leroy D. Baca and (2) granting qualified immunity to the individual defendants on the First Amendment claim. We remand for the district court to resolve Plaintiffs' conspiracy claim and request for injunctive relief.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts

Plaintiff Center for Bio-Ethical Reform (Bio-Ethical Reform) is a non-profit organization whose main purpose is to promote "prenatal justice and the right to life for the unborn, the disabled, the infirm, the aged, and all vulnerable peoples through education and the development of innovative educational programs." One of the educational programs is called the "Reproductive Choice Campaign." With this campaign, Bio-Ethical Reform seeks to "expose as many people as possible to the reality of abortion" by displaying large, graphic photographs of first-term aborted fetuses on the sides of trucks. The trucks often drive on surface streets and freeways, but Bio-Ethical Reform employees and volunteers sometimes take the trucks to specified places to target particular audiences.

Middle school and high school students are a common target audience. Bio-Ethical Reform conducts its campaign at such schools because it believes its message will discourage teenage abortions. Bio-Ethical Reform also believes that "students who are old enough to have an abortion are old enough to see one." Bio-Ethical Reform personnel arrive at the start of the academic day so that students will see Bio-Ethical Reforms's enlarged photographic images of first-term aborted fetuses as they arrive for school.

Gregg Cunningham, Bio-Ethical Reform's Executive Director, acknowledged in his deposition that he has seen students "faint," "become physically ill," "weep," "avert their gaze," and "leave the room" in response to these pictures. Cunningham said that the "typical" reaction is disbelief. He defended Bio-Ethical Reform's display of aborted fetuses, saying that "[s]tudents are routinely exposed to disturbing images, whether it's airlines exploding into skyscrapers or choose your atrocity." Cunningham also asserted that exposing children to such pictures is the best way to teach them about the ethical issues involving abortion: "you can't teach inexpressively horrific historical fact in exclusive reliance on the written or spoken word. Teachers who teach about racial injustice use pictures of black people being beaten to their knees for trying to register to vote."

On March 24, 2003, Plaintiffs Paul Kulas, a Bio-Ethical Reform employee, and Thomas Padberg, a Bio-Ethical Reform volunteer, drove to Dodson Middle School in Rancho Palos Verdes, California. Kulas drove a truck that displayed the photographic images of aborted fetuses and Padberg drove an escort "security

vehicle." The security vehicle was a white Ford Crown Victoria sedan equipped with a security cage, red-and-amber flashing lights, push bars, and antennae mounted on the roof. The two men arrived at the school at about 7:30 a.m. — about thirty minutes before classes began. They then drove on public streets around the perimeter of the school.

Plaintiffs' graphic display quickly caused concern among school officials. Defendant Art Roberts, an assistant principal at Dodson Middle School, identified traffic as one of his primary concerns. According to him, 85 to 95 percent of Dodson's 2000 students arrive by bus or car between 7:15 a.m. and 8:00 a.m. The students' arrival causes "heavy traffic" around the school. This traffic can become a safety hazard when drivers or pedestrians become upset, angry, or distracted. At a preliminary hearing, Roberts testified that during the time he had worked at Dodson Middle School, vehicles on streets around the school had struck five children and killed two.

On the day Plaintiffs were at Dodson Middle School, Assistant Principal Roberts observed some children stopping on the sidewalks and staring at the photographs of aborted fetuses, while others momentarily stood in the middle of the street. Faculty members also reported "abnormal" difficulty getting children onto the campus.

Assistant Principal Roberts identified additional concerns. He saw a number of children express anger over Plaintiffs' graphic display. He also overheard a group of boys planning to throw rocks at the truck. The group disbanded only after Roberts confronted them.

Assistant Principal Roberts observed two or three girls crying. He also said that at least one class spent time discussing the truck's displayed images of aborted fetuses. Nevertheless, Assistant Principal Roberts said the school had a "fairly normal opening" and that all students he could see were on the campus by the start of classes at 8:01 a.m.

School officials contacted the Sheriff's Department at about 7:50 a.m. The dispatcher sent a text message to Deputy Sheriffs Mark Darling and Mark Repcik, who were driving separate vehicles. The message stated that an "[a]nti-abortion truck with offensive language and pictures is circling the school and videotaping the school and surrounding area." The Sheriff's Department station desk also radioed Deputy Repcik and told him a "large white truck [was] driving [around] the middle school [with] very graphic pictures on the sides and [was] disrupting the school."

At 8:05 a.m., Deputy Sheriffs Darling and Repcik stopped Plaintiff Kulas, who was driving the display truck, and Plaintiff Padberg, who was driving the "security vehicle." According to Kulas, Deputy Darling told him that the Deputy Sheriffs stopped the two vehicles because they were "driving these pictures around the school with offensive language, and . . . scaring kids . . . ." During the stop, no Deputy Sheriff drew his gun or handcuffed Kulas or Padberg. The deputies allowed Kulas and Padberg to move freely about the immediate area and talk to each other for the duration of the stop.

Thirty minutes later, Deputy Sheriff Sergeant Xavier Aguilar arrived. According to Deputy Sheriffs

Darling and Repcik, they summoned Sergeant Aguilar, their supervisor, to the scene because they had never dealt with a comparable situation. Deputy Sheriff Dave Despot, the liaison to Dodson Middle School, was also summoned to the scene. He arrived between fifteen and thirty minutes after Aguilar arrived. Despot took photographs of the security vehicle and the truck. He then went into the school to speak with Assistant Principal Roberts.

At some point, Deputy Sheriff Darling entered the security vehicle to activate the switch for the flashing red-and-amber lights. Then, with Padberg's permission, Darling searched the vehicle for weapons. The record does not indicate whether there were two discrete searches or only one.

Eventually, Assistant Principal Roberts accompanied Deputy Despot back to the scene, and, after reading California Penal Code § 626.8 to Kulas and Padberg, told them that they must leave the area around the school. Kulas and Padberg promptly left the area at 9:20 a.m. Plaintiffs assert that, because of fear of arrest, they have taken their Reproductive Choice Campaign to only one other school in Los Angeles County since the March 24, 2003 incident.

B. Procedural History

Plaintiffs filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit on April 17, 2003. Their complaint seeks nominal damages from Assistant Principal Roberts, and from Deputy Sheriffs Repcik, Darling, Despot, and Sergeant Aguilar. Plaintiffs sought an injunction to restrain the four Deputy Sheriffs, Assistant Principal Roberts, Sheriff

Baca (in his official capacity), and the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department from enforcing § 626.8 against Plaintiffs' abortion speech activities. Finally, Plaintiffs sought a declaration that § 626.8 is unconstitutional as applied to Plaintiffs' activities. Plaintiffs do not seek monetary damages from the Sheriff's Department.

The district court granted the individual defendants'[1] motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), holding that these defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.[2] The district court dismissed Sheriff Baca as a redundant defendant. On February 10, 2005, the district court granted summary judgment for all defendants and denied summary judgment for Plaintiffs. This timely appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court's decision on cross-motions for summary judgment is reviewed de novo. *ACLU of Nev. v. City of Las Vegas*, 466 F.3d 784, 790 (9th Cir. 2006). Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we must determine whether genuine issues of material fact exist. *Id.* When

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[1] The phrase "individual defendants," refers to the defendants sued in their individual capacity: Deputies Repcik, Darling and Despot, Sergeant Aguilar, and Assistant Principal Roberts.

[2] The district court did not specify whether qualified immunity applied only to the First Amendment claims or to all claims. The court declined to clarify the scope of its grant of immunity in the summary judgment order, instead holding that the issue was moot.

presented with cross-motions for summary judgment, we review each motion for summary judgment separately, giving the nonmoving party for each motion the benefit of all reasonable inferences. *Id.* at 790-91.

III. FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUES

Plaintiffs contend that the application of § 626.8 under the circumstances presented here violated their First Amendment rights. We have serious concerns about the constitutionality of the statute as applied. We need not decide, however, whether the statute as applied is unconstitutional because we conclude that the California courts would construe the statute narrowly so as not to apply to Plaintiffs' conduct.

A. Applicability of Penal Code § 626.8

1. First Amendment concerns

Plaintiffs sought to express their anti-abortion message on a public street, a traditional public forum. *See Frisby v. Schultz*, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988) ("[A]ll public streets are held in the public trust and are properly considered traditional public fora."); *see also PeTA v. Rasmussen*, 298 F.3d 1198, 1204 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that the sidewalks near a public school are a traditional public forum). Generally, content-based speech restrictions in public fora are subject to strict scrutiny. *Flint v. Dennison*, 488 F.3d 816, 830 (9th Cir. 2007).

[1] The government may, however, impose reasonable "time, place, or manner" regulations on

speech in public fora, provided the regulations "are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, . . . are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and . . . leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information." *Ward v. Rock Against Racism*, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (quoting *Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence*, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)). We therefore first address whether the application of § 626.8 to Plaintiffs' display of photographs of aborted fetuses outside Dodson Middle School would qualify as a content-neutral time, place, or manner regulation. We conclude that it is questionable whether the statute, if it applies to Plaintiffs' conduct in this case, would satisfy the first criterion — that it be "justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech." *Id.*

[2] We previously noted that a law "is content-based if either the main purpose in enacting it was to suppress or exalt speech of a certain content, or it differentiates based on the content of speech on its face." *ACLU*, 466 F.3d at 793. Defendants argue that § 626.8 is content-neutral because it is justified by a purpose unrelated to the content of the message — namely, the "compelling interest in having an undisrupted school session conducive to the students' learning." *See Grayned v. City of Rockford*, 408 U.S. 104, 119 (1972).[3]

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[3] We note that in this case, unlike in *Grayned*, the school setting alone does not justify the restriction applied to Plaintiffs. *Grayned* identified disruptions of "normal school activities" as "boisterous demonstrators who drown out classroom conversation, make studying impossible, block entrances, or incite children to leave the schoolhouse." *Grayned*, 408 U.S. at 118-19. Further

[3] The language of § 626.8 does not indicate an intent to suppress speech of a certain content. That lack of purpose, however, does not render application of the statute to Plaintiffs' speech content-neutral. If the statute, as read by the police officers on the scene, would allow or disallow speech depending on the reaction of the audience, then the ordinance would run afoul of an independent species of prohibitions on content-restrictive regulations, often described as a First Amendment-based ban on the "heckler's veto."[4] *See Bachellar v. Maryland*, 397 U.S. 564, 567 (1970) ("[I]t is firmly settled that under our Constitution the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers, or simply because bystanders object to peaceful and orderly demonstrations.") (quotation marks and citations omitted); *see also, e.g.*, *Gooding v. Wilson*, 405 U.S. 518, 527 (1972); *Cox v. Louisiana*, 379 U.S. 536, 551-52 (1965); *Terminiello v. City of Chicago*, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949). Thus, as the Supreme Court has made clear, the government cannot silence messages simply because they cause discomfort, fear, or even anger:

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emphasizing this focus on *classroom* interruption, *Grayned* noted with approval that the ordinance did not restrict "expressive activity before or after the school session, while the student/faculty 'audience' enters and leaves the school," *id.* at 120 — the precise situation presented here. The school setting here thus provides no authority to engage in otherwise impermissible restrictions.

[4] The term "heckler's veto" first appeared in a footnote in *Brown v. Louisiana*, 383 U.S. 131, 133 n.1 (1966). We use this term to describe restrictions on speech that stem from listeners' negative reactions to a particular message.

> [I]n our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression. Any departure from absolute regimentation may cause trouble. Any variation from the majority's opinion may inspire fear. Any word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus, that deviates from the views of another person may start an argument or cause a disturbance. But our Constitution says we must take this risk . . . .

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).

[4] The disruptions caused by the Plaintiffs' conduct were all a result of the students' reactions to Plaintiffs' message. Assistant Principal Roberts stated that he saw two or three girls cry and that he heard several angry boys discuss throwing rocks at Plaintiffs' truck. Roberts also stated that the faculty had more difficulty than normal getting children into classes. There is some evidence that students discussed Plaintiffs' display of images of first-term aborted fetuses during class time. Finally, the children did not go into the school as quickly as usual. Some students stopped in the street momentarily and stared at the truck, causing traffic congestion. These incidents were all reactions to the *message* displayed on Plaintiffs' truck.

In *Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement*, 505 U.S. 123, 134 (1992), the Supreme Court emphasized that "[l]isteners' reaction to speech is not a content-neutral basis for regulation" — in other words, the

First Amendment does not permit a heckler's veto. *Forsyth County* struck down an ordinance as unconstitutionally content-based because the statute based parade fees on the estimated cost of maintaining public order during the event. Because the size of the fee "depend[ed] on the administrator's measure of the amount of hostility likely to be created by the speech based on its content," the ordinance unconstitutionally burdened speech that was "unpopular with bottle throwers." *Id.*

As the cases cited above indicate, *Forsyth County* was not the first or only case to hold that a regulation that depends upon listeners' reaction to speech is not a content-neutral regulation. In *Cox v. Louisiana*, for example, the Supreme Court held that police could not justify shutting down a civil rights demonstration on public sidewalks as a breach of the peace on the ground that there was a "fear of violence . . . based upon the reaction of the group of white citizens looking on from across the street." 379 U.S. at 550. Like *Forsyth County*, *Cox* rested on the premise that "constitutional rights may not be denied simply because of hostility to their assertion or exercise." *Id.* at 551 (quoting *Watson v. City of Memphis*, 373 U.S. 526, 535 (1963)).

The venerable heckler's veto line of cases does not align perfectly with a standard this court has recently used to help determine whether a regulation is content-based: whether "a law enforcement officer must read a [communication's] message to determine

if the [communication] is exempted from the ordinance." *ACLU*, 466 F.3d at 795-96.[5]

[5] The "read the message" test, however, cannot encompass the universe of content-based statutes because the test does not fully account for the heckler's veto line of cases. Here, the government did not prospectively gauge the effect of the message (and ban it accordingly), but instead waited for, and then responded to, listeners' reactions. Whether prospectively, as in *Forsyth County*, or retrospectively, as in the case before us, the government may not give weight to the audience's negative reaction.[6]

[6] To account for *Cox* and similar cases, our inquiry must focus on the reason for the government's restriction of speech. If *listeners* react to speech based on its content and the government then ratifies that reaction by restricting the speech *in response to listeners' objections*, then the restriction is content-based. *Cf. Ovadal v. City of Madison*, 469 F.3d 625, 630 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that the removal of a protester carrying large signs on busy highway overpass is content-based if his "*message* angered drivers who then reacted and were distracted from the task of driving safely" but content-neutral if his "*presence* on that day and under those driving conditions created a 'spectacle' that led some drivers to

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[5] Whether an officer must read a message is persuasive evidence of an impermissible content-based purpose, but is not dispositive. *ACLU*, 466 F.3d at 796 n.12.

[6] There is, of course, an exception for certain "fighting words." *See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire*, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942).

be distracted from the task of safely navigating the Beltline") (emphases in original).

Nor is the reaction of listeners a secondary effect of speech that can be regulated under *City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.*, 475 U.S. 41, 46 (1986). *See Boos v. Barry*, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) ("The emotive impact of speech on its audience is not a 'secondary effect.' "); *see also Crawford v. Lungren*, 96 F.3d 380, 385 (9th Cir. 1996) ("The Supreme Court has defined secondary effects as being correlated with, *but not directly a consequence of*, the impact of the speech.") (emphasis added).

Section 626.8, if it applied to Plaintiffs' conduct in this case, would appear to be just the kind of accession to the heckler's veto outlawed by the case law. Plaintiffs' speech was permitted until the students and drivers around the school reacted to it, at which point the speech was deemed disruptive and ordered stopped under § 626.8. This application of the statute raises serious First Amendment concerns.[7]

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[7] We recognize that one of our sister circuits, in a case discussing a nearly identical statute, has held otherwise. In *PeTA v. Rasmussen*, 298 F.3d 1198 (10th Cir. 2002), an animal-rights organization staged a protest outside of a junior high school shortly before the end of classes; a counterprotest was also held. *Id.* at 1201. "The protests were not noisy, but some students allegedly were distracted, stayed late, missed their rides, or sought to interact with the protesters." *Id.* at 1202. The police directed the protesters to cease, citing a state statute substantively mirroring § 626.8. The statute did not apply to junior high schools, however, and the police subsequently admitted their mistake.

We are mindful that this case involves a special circumstance, the presence of children. In particular, the evidence suggests that children were distracted by the Plaintiffs' pictures, and this distraction perhaps posed a danger as students crossed the streets around the school. Children may well be particularly susceptible to distraction or emotion in the face of controversial speech, and may not always be expected to react responsibly. These considerations, among others, might conceivably support the proposition that the heckler's veto principle is less sweeping where the targeted audience is children.

There is, however, no precedent for a "minors" exception to the prohibition on banning speech because of listeners' reaction to its content.[8] It would therefore

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The Tenth Circuit nonetheless held that the misapplication of the statute was content-neutral:

> Although the defendants misapplied the statute to PeTA, their misapplication of the statute was unrelated to the content of PeTA's speech. The school also applied the ban to META [the counter-protesters], which expressed the opposite message from PeTA. Defendants' actions were thus content-neutral.

Id. at 1204. We disagree with this analysis. That the statute was applied to protesters on both sides of the issue demonstrates only that it was *viewpoint*-neutral. *See Boos*, 485 U.S. at 319. Shutting down dueling protests does not discriminate based on viewpoint, but is nonetheless a content-based heckler's veto if the reason for the restriction was that bystanders were uncomfortable with the controversial content of the messages.

[8] There is, however, at least one circumstance in which First Amendment standards have been specially tailored to protect

be an unprecedented departure from bedrock First Amendment principles to allow the government to restrict speech based on listener reaction simply because the listeners are children. At the least, applying § 626.8 to Plaintiffs' speech in this case raises a novel constitutional issue. Unless we create a new exception to the "heckler's veto" doctrine (which we do not do), applying § 626.8 to Plaintiffs' speech would be unconstitutional.

We decline to create such an exception, in part because we can reasonably construe § 626.8 as not applicable to the present circumstances.[9] Where a construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, courts "will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of [the legislature]." *Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council*, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988).

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children. *See Ginsberg v. New York*, 390 U.S. 629, 640-41 (1968) (relying on the state's interest "to protect the welfare of children and to see that they are safeguarded from abuses which might prevent their growth into free and independent well-developed men[, women] and citizens" to hold that it is permissible to protect children from being exposed to pornography that was not obscene) (internal quotations omitted).

[9] The California legislature may elect to draft a statute prohibiting disruptive messages outside school buildings where the disruption threatens the physical safety of school children while they are coming to, leaving, or attending school. We do not have before us, and therefore do not decide the constitutionality of, such a statute.

Here, if § 626.8 applies only to disruptions caused by the *manner* and not the *content* of speech, our First Amendment concerns are resolved. A statute that restricts speech only when it is disruptive because of its manner, not its content, is an example of content-neutral regulation that has been affirmed time and again. In *Grayned*, for example, in dealing with an anti-noise ordinance, the Supreme Court upheld the regulation of speech that would — because of its high-decibel manner of communication, not its content — prevent classroom teaching or studying.[10] 408 U.S. at 119. Similarly, we have narrowed an injunction prohibiting "shouting, screaming, chanting, or yelling" during demonstrations outside an abortion clinic to specify that such conduct be enjoined only if it is "in a volume that substantially interferes with the provision of medical services within the [clinic]." *Portland Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Advocates for Life, Inc.*, 859 F.2d 681, 686-87 (9th Cir. 1988). This narrow interpretation ensured that the speech was enjoined

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[10] The ordinance at issue in *Grayned* is strikingly similar to § 626.8. The ordinance there prohibited "willfully mak[ing] or assist[ing] in the making of any noise or diversion which disturbs or tends to disturb the peace or good order of such school session or class thereof." 408 U.S. at 108. The Supreme Court rejected a constitutional challenge because it concluded that the state supreme court would construe the ordinance narrowly to prohibit "only actual or imminent interference with the 'peace or good order' of the school." *Id.* at 111-12. It further held that the ordinance was not "a vague, general 'breach of the peace' ordinance, but a statute written specifically for the school context, where the prohibited disturbances are easily measured by their impact on the normal activities of the school." *Id.* at 112. So construed, the ordinance "does not permit punishment for the expression of an unpopular point of view." *Id.* at 113.

only if its *manner* caused disruption to the clinic's services, rather than if its *content* upset the patients or staff. Therefore, we must address whether § 626.8 applies only where the manner, not the content, of speech near schools is distracting to listeners. If so, we need not decide the constitutionality of a content-restrictive statute, for such a statute is not before us.

2. Construing § 626.8

In similar circumstances — that is, to avoid deciding serious constitutional issues — federal courts have narrowly construed state or local statutes. *See, e.g.*, *Frisby*, 487 U.S. at 482; *Phelps v. Hamilton*, 59 F.3d 1058, 1070 (10th Cir. 1995) ("[Although] federal courts do not have the power to narrow a state law by disregarding plain language in the statute just to preserve it from constitutional attack . . . . , we are permitted to construe ambiguous state statutes and to extrapolate the true meaning of such statutes according to traditional rules of statutory construction, and then to judge the constitutionality of such statutes as so construed."); *Cohen v. City of Des Plaines*, 8 F.3d 484, 493 (7th Cir. 1993) (construing a city ordinance narrowly to avoid Establishment Clause problem); *see also Grayned*, 408 U.S. at 111-12 (construing local ordinance narrowly after concluding that the state supreme court would so construe the ordinance). In our view, the Supreme Court of California would, were the issue presented to them, construe § 626.8 to apply only to interference or disruption caused by the manner of a person's expressive conduct.

[7] California Penal Code § 626.8 provides, in relevant part:

> (a) Any person who comes into any school building or upon any school ground, or street, sidewalk or public way adjacent thereto, without lawful business thereon, and whose presence or acts interfere with the peaceful conduct of the activities of the school or disrupt the school or its pupils or school activities, is guilty of a misdemeanor if he or she does any of the following:
>
> > (1) Remains there after being asked to leave by the chief administrative official of that school or his or her designated representative, or by a . . . sheriff or deputy sheriff . . . .
> >
> > (2) Reenters or comes upon that place within seven days of being asked to leave by a person specified in paragraph (1).
> >
> > (3) Has otherwise established a continued pattern of unauthorized entry.
>
> *This section shall not be utilized to impinge upon the lawful exercise of constitutionally protected rights of freedom of speech or assembly.*

Cal. Penal Code § 626.8(a) (emphasis added).

As an initial matter, California courts regularly construe arguably ambiguous statutes narrowly to avoid First Amendment problems. In doing so, California courts have enunciated the principle that "the court should construe the enactment so as to limit

its effect and operation to matters that may be constitutionally regulated or prohibited." *People v. Superior Court (Anderson)*, 151 Cal. App. 3d 893, 895-96 (Ct. App. 1984) (quoting *Welton v. City of Los Angeles*, 18 Cal. 3d 497, 505-06 (1976)). For example, in *In re Manuel G.*, 16 Cal. 4th 805, 814 (1997), the California Supreme Court considered a statute imposing criminal penalties on "[e]very person who attempts, by means of any threat or violence, to deter or prevent an executive officer from performing any duty imposed upon such officer by law . . . ." The court agreed with lower court decisions narrowly construing the statute: "To avoid the risk of punishing protected First Amendment speech, . . . the term 'threat' has been limited to mean a threat of unlawful violence used in an attempt to deter the officer." *Id.* at 814-15; *see also People v. Zimmerman*, 15 Cal. App. 4th Supp. 7, 12 (Ct. App. 1993) ("A statute challenged for overbreadth is not void if its terms are reasonably susceptible to an interpretation consistent with the Constitution."); *City & County of San Francisco v. Eller Outdoor Adver.*, 192 Cal. App. 3d 643, 663 (Ct. App. 1987) ("It is the duty of the courts, wherever possible, to construe a statute in a manner which is reasonable, consistent with the statutory purpose, and eliminates doubts as to its constitutionality."); *Loska v. Superior Court*, 188 Cal. App. 3d 569, 584 (Ct. App. 1986) ("In order to save the ordinance as a whole, we 'construe the enactment so as to limit its effect and operation to matters that may be constitutionally . . . prohibited.' ") (alteration in original, quoting *Welton*, 18 Cal. 3d at 505).

[8] Here, a narrowing construction is invited by the plain language of § 626.8: "This section shall not be

utilized to impinge upon the lawful exercise of constitutionally protected rights of freedom of speech or assembly." The California legislature thus contemplated the possibility that § 626.8 might, if construed broadly, apply to constitutionally protected speech, and sought to prevent such an application. Further, the exclusionary clause is drafted expansively, barring applications that "impinge," rather than "violate," protected speech. Thus, the legislature seemingly meant to make the statute inapplicable where First Amendment rights are possibly affected, even if the statute *could* validly restrict those rights.[11]

[9] Finally, apart from the exclusionary clause, the language of § 626.8 suggests that it was intended to apply to manner rather than content of speech. Section 626.8 applies where the "presence" or "acts" of a person "interfere[s]" with the school's activities or "disrupt[s] the school or its pupils." The terms "presence" and "acts" indicate that § 626.8 is concerned with the physical aspects of a speaker's behavior, *not* with the

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[11] The California legislature sometimes drafts First Amendment savings clauses more narrowly, so as merely to limit the statute to what is constitutionally permissible. For instance, California Penal Code § 420.1 provides that it "shall not apply to . . . any person who is engaging in activities protected by the California Constitution or the United States Constitution." The same "shall not apply to" language is used in Penal Code §§ 602(o), 602.1, and 602.8. Similarly, Penal Code § 646.9(f)-(g) provides that "[c]onstitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of" certain terms in the statutory definition of the crime. This "shall not apply" and "is not included" language is narrower than the broad "shall not be used to impinge" language in the statute at issue here. We should give effect to this difference.

content of his speech. Similarly, the words "interfere" and "disrupt" are active verbs that focus on the behavior of the speaker, not on the reaction of the listeners.

[10] As a whole, the language of § 626.8 does not evidence any intent to criminalize a person's behavior based on a listener's reaction to the content of his speech. We thus conclude that the California courts would construe § 626.8 to apply to speech only when the disruption caused by the speaker is caused by the *manner* of the speech. Controversial words and images that, because of their content, upset the listener and cause the *listener* to behave disruptively are not covered by the statute.

[11] Under our narrow construction, § 626.8 does not apply to Plaintiffs' conduct in driving their trucks around Dodson Middle School. That conduct was disruptive only because of the audience's reaction to the content of the speech. Children became upset, a few boys talked about throwing rocks, other children stood in the middle of the street and slowed the entry of students into school, and at least one class spent time discussing the photos of fetuses instead of their prescribed school work. All of these reactions were triggered by the upsetting message on the truck — not by noise, or physical obstruction, or any other aspect of Plaintiffs' activities. Construing § 626.8 as we do, the statute provided no basis to prohibit Plaintiffs from continuing to drive their vehicles around the school before classes began.

[12] Section 626.8 was the only authority cited by Defendants in asking Plaintiffs to leave, and thus

provided the only possible source of a significant governmental interest necessary to restrict Plaintiffs' speech in a public forum. *See Ward*, 491 U.S. at 791-92. Misapplying a statute is not a significant governmental interest. Defendants have suggested no other significant governmental interest to justify restricting Plaintiffs' speech. We therefore hold that the Deputy Sheriffs violated Plaintiffs' First Amendment right of free speech.

B. Qualified Immunity

We next consider whether the district court correctly determined that the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity for Plaintiffs' First Amendment claims.[12] We review a grant of qualified immunity de novo. *Bias v. Moynihan*, 508 F.3d 1212, 1218 (9th Cir. 2007).

[13] Qualified immunity involves a two-step inquiry: (1) whether the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right; and (2) whether that right was clearly established when viewed in the context of this case. *See Ganwich v. Knapp*, 319 F.3d 1115, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing *Saucier v. Katz*, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). As discussed above, Plaintiffs have established that Defendants violated their constitutional rights. We must therefore decide whether those rights were clearly established.

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[12] As noted above, it is not entirely clear whether the district court decided this issue on the merits.

A right is clearly established if its contours are "sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." *Saucier*, 533 U.S. at 202 (quoting *Anderson v. Creighton*, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). Even if the right is clear, however, we must determine whether the officers made a reasonable mistake about the law's requirements. *See id.* at 205.

[14] Here, it was clear that the officers could not apply a time, place or manner restriction on speech to the Plaintiffs' activities around the school without advancing any significant state interest by doing so. But the officers could have made a reasonable mistake in believing that § 626.8 applied to Plaintiffs' conduct and thus advanced a significant state interest. *Grossman v. City of Portland*, 33 F.3d 1200, 1209 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[A]n officer who acts in reliance on a duly-enacted statute or ordinance is ordinarily entitled to qualified immunity."). There was no case law determining whether § 626.8 does or does not apply to the circumstances the officers faced. *See Dittman v. California*, 191 F.3d 1020, 1027 (9th Cir. 1999) (defendant entitled to qualified immunity where she "acted pursuant to a duly enacted state statute" and "there was no clear case law in either the federal courts or the state courts of California establishing that" the statute may not be applied in the challenged manner); *see also Way v. County of Ventura*, 445 F.3d 1157, 1166 (9th Cir. 2006) (Wardlaw, J., concurring) (defendants entitled to qualified immunity where they relied on police policy and state statute in conducting unconstitutional strip-search because "the policy and the state statute had not fallen into desuetude, nor were they patently violative of fundamental

constitutional principles") (citation and quotation marks omitted). And, although we believe that our reading of the statute is one California courts would adopt, that conclusion is premised in part on the practice of avoiding unconstitutional interpretations of statutes, not solely on the language of the statute.

[15] Moreover, as we have noted, there is some question whether the heckler's veto consideration applies where the target audience consists of children. As far as we have been able to determine, there is no case law holding either that it does or that it does not. In these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the law was sufficiently clear that a reasonable officer would know that it was unlawful to request the Plaintiffs to cease driving their truck around the area. *See Hope v. Pelzer*, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) (relevant inquiry is whether "the state of the law [at the relevant time] gave [defendants] fair warning that their [conduct] was unconstitutional"); *Porter v. Bowen*, 496 F.3d 1009, 1026 (9th Cir. 2007) (qualified immunity where court itself "had to wrestle with difficult and unsettled questions about the First Amendment interests implicated by [plaintiffs' conduct] and the weight of the countervailing interests asserted by the State"). We therefore affirm the district court's conclusion that the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on the First Amendment claim.

C. Summary of First Amendment Claim

California Penal Code § 626.8, read as we believe a California court would construe it, does not apply to Plaintiffs' expressive activities in driving their trucks

around Dodson Middle School. Thus, the officers' order that Plaintiffs leave the area around Dodson Middle School violated Plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. The individual defendants, however, have qualified immunity from a damages action. As this immunity does not extend to injunctive relief, *see Hydrick v. Hunter*, 500 F.3d 978, 988 (9th Cir. 2007), we remand for the district court to consider Plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief in light of our First Amendment holding.

IV. FOURTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS

We now address Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claims. Plaintiffs contend that the Deputy Sheriffs violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by unreasonably detaining Kulas and Padberg for seventy-five minutes. Plaintiffs also claim that the Deputy Sheriffs searched the security vehicle without securing Kulas's or Padberg's consent. We review de novo the lawfulness of a search or seizure, *United States v. Stafford*, 416 F.3d 1068, 1073 (9th Cir. 2005), and address each claim in turn.

A. The Seventy-Five Minute Detention

Plaintiffs contend that their seventy-five minute detention at the scene was unreasonably long and therefore violated their Fourth Amendment rights. We agree.

[16] A dispatcher's call to the Deputy Sheriff indicated that a large white truck was disturbing Dodson Middle School and that the truck was accompanied by a vehicle similar to a police cruiser.

Based on this information, the Deputy Sheriffs had reasonable suspicion to believe Kulas and Padberg may have been violating several California Vehicle Code provisions.[13] *See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court*, 542 U.S. 177, 185 (2004) (requiring that investigative stops be predicated on reasonable suspicion to believe further investigation may produce evidence that the person is involved in criminal activity). Because there was reasonable suspicion, the initial investigative stop was proper.

[17] Once the sheriffs validly initiated an investigative stop, no rigid time constraints governed its duration, so long as the sheriffs acted diligently and pursued a means of investigation likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly. *United States v. Sharpe*, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985). Here, although a brief detention to investigate possible Vehicle Code violations was warranted, that investigation should have taken no more than a few minutes — enough time to examine the security vehicle and to determine if there were any outstanding warrants involving the vehicle or its occupants.[14]

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[13] *E.g.*, Cal. Veh. Code § 25268 (prohibiting display of "a flashing amber warning light on a vehicle"), § 25269 (prohibiting display of "a flashing or steady burning red warning light on a vehicle"), § 25279(b) (private security vehicles can use flashing amber lights only if vehicle is clearly marked as private security), § 27605 (prohibiting ownership and operation of a vehicle painted to resemble a police car).

[14] Defendants suggest that the detention was also reasonable because of potential violations of two California Education Code provisions: § 32210 ("Any person who willfully disturbs any public school or any public school meeting is guilty of a

Defendants argue that the seventy-five minute detention was justified by their reasonable suspicion that Plaintiffs violated California Penal Code § 626.8. But a person is only guilty of a crime pursuant to § 626.8 if they (1) remain at a school *after being asked to leave*; (2) reenter within seven days of being asked to leave; or (3) engage in a "continued pattern of unauthorized entry." Plaintiffs did none of these things. They were not asked to leave until the *end* of the seventy-five minute detention, at which point they promptly left. So, with respect to § 626.8, the officers *at no time* had any reason to suspect that the Plaintiffs had committed or were about to commit this crime.[15]

There is a second reason why the length of the detention was not justified by reasonable suspicion.

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misdemeanor. . . .") and § 44811 ("[A]ny . . . person whose conduct in a place where a school employee is required to be in the course of his or her duties materially disrupts classwork or extracurricular activities or involves substantial disorder is guilty of a misdemeanor."). These provisions also might justify a brief detention. But, as with the suspected Vehicle Code violations, there is no explanation of why it would take seventy five minutes to investigate them. Presumably, just speaking to Plaintiffs and school officials would be sufficient.

[15] That Plaintiffs did not commit a crime under § 626.8 does not impact the potential application of the statute to their First Amendment rights. The statute proceeds in two parts: First, faced with conduct that interferes with or disrupts a school, an officer can order the disrupting person to leave, on pain of prosecution if he does not. If applicable to protected speech activity, this order would itself impact First Amendment rights. Second, only if the person refuses to leave when ordered to do so can he be charged with a crime. Because Plaintiffs left immediately after being ordered to do so, they never committed a crime under § 626.8.

Much of the detention time was spent waiting for the Deputy Sheriffs' supervisor to come to the scene to assist with this novel situation. But once it became clear that no Vehicle Code violations had taken place, the Deputy Sheriffs were no longer authorized to detain Plaintiffs based on a reasonable suspicion that any particular crime had been committed. Instead, the Deputy Sheriffs continued to detain plaintiffs because they were waiting for their supervisors to help them figure out *whether* any crime had been committed.

This basis for continued detention does not comport with Fourth Amendment standards. The investigative purposes permitted by detention are ones of fact, not law. *See Michigan v. Summers*, 452 U.S. 692, 700 n.12 (1981) (listing some investigative techniques that may be used during a *Terry* stop: "interrogation[;] . . . communicat[ion] with others, either police or private citizens, in an effort to verify the explanation tendered or to confirm the identification or determine whether a person of that identity is otherwise wanted[;] . . . [and determination of whether] in fact an offense has occurred in the area"). Thus, an officer's uncertainty about the law cannot excuse the detention. To permit otherwise "would remove the incentive for police to make certain that they properly understand the law that they are entrusted to enforce and obey." *See United States v. Lopez-Soto*, 205 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000); *see also United States v. Tibbetts*, 396 F.3d 1132, 1138 (10th Cir. 2005) ("[F]ailure to understand the law by the very person charged with enforcing it is *not* objectively reasonable.") (emphasis in original); *cf. United States v. Booker*, 496 F.3d 717, 722 (D.C. Cir. 2007) ("Unlike stops premised on mistakes of fact, '[s]tops premised on a mistake of law, even a

reasonable, good-faith mistake, are generally held to be unconstitutional.'") (alteration in original) (quoting *United States v. Coplin*, 463 F.3d 96, 101 (1st Cir. 2006)).

[18] In sum, neither California Penal Code § 626.8 nor the search for other code provisions that might have been violated justified the Deputy Sheriffs in detaining the Plaintiffs for seventy-five minutes while the sheriffs tried to find some basis for charging them. Consequently, we hold that the deputies' detention of Kulas and Padberg violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Accordingly, we reverse both the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants and the district court's denial of summary judgment for Plaintiffs with respect to this issue.

B. Search of Security Vehicle

Plaintiffs also maintain that the Deputy Sheriffs violated their Fourth Amendment rights by improperly searching Plaintiffs' security vehicle. Defendants contend that the deputies had the consent of Kulas and Padberg and, in any event, the Deputy Sheriffs acted pursuant to California Vehicle Code § 2806, which permits inspection of vehicles suspected of violating the Vehicle Code. We conclude that Plaintiffs have raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the deputies violated their Fourth Amendment rights.

At the outset, we note a significant factual dispute. Padberg claimed that deputies searched the security vehicle twice, but only secured consent for the second

search. Deputies Repcik and Darling remember only one search, and claim they had permission. The recording from the security vehicle's camera does not clearly identify how many times the deputies entered the vehicle, or whether they had consent. This conflicting testimony raises a credibility question that only the factfinder can resolve. *See Freeman v. Arpaio*, 125 F.3d 732, 735 (9th Cir. 1997). For our review of the district court's grant of summary judgment for Defendants, we assume that the Plaintiffs' version of events is true. *See Moreno v. Baca*, 431 F.3d 633, 638 (9th Cir. 2005).

Thus, for the purposes of this appeal, we accept Plaintiffs' assertion that two searches took place, and that the first was not supported by consent. We must therefore evaluate whether the first search violated Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights. Defendants cite California Vehicle Code § 2806 as justification for this search. We conclude that, absent consent, the search was improper.

Section 2806 provides as follows:

> Any . . . deputy sheriff . . . having reasonable cause to believe that any vehicle or combination of vehicles is not equipped as required by this code or is in any unsafe condition as to endanger any person, may require the driver to stop and submit the vehicle or combination of vehicles to an inspection and those tests as may be appropriate to determine the safety to persons and compliance with the code.

Cal. Veh. Code § 2806. The deputies entered Plaintiffs' security vehicle to determine whether the flashing lights could be activated. They now contend that their entry was necessary to ensure that the vehicle complied with the Vehicle Code.

[19] We addressed the validity of § 2806 searches in *United States v. Portillo*, 633 F.2d 1313 (9th Cir. 1980). In *Portillo*, a police officer opened a vehicle's trunk to identify the cause of a broken rear brake light. *Id.* at 1315. We upheld the search, reasoning that § 2806 allowed police to enter a vehicle to discover the cause of a potentially dangerous condition: in that case, the possibility that the car's electrical wiring had degraded. *See id.* at 1318-19. We also cautioned, however, that the defect justified entry because it "was not only a code violation, but a threat to the safety of persons on the highway" and that further inspection might either provide an easy remedy or identify more serious safety concerns. *Id.* at 1319.

[20] *Portillo* does not legitimize the search of Plaintiffs' security vehicle. A search's reasonableness depends on "the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy, and . . . the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests." *United States v. Knights*, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001) (quoting *Wyoming v. Houghton*, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)). Unlike *Portillo*, the existence of the flashing lights here does not suggest any hidden cause that might be a more serious safety hazard, and further inspection of the lights would not likely expose more serious code violations. None of the Vehicle Code sections cited by the Deputy Sheriffs turn on whether the lights are *capable* of activation. Thus, entry to

activate the lights would not further the government's interests.[16] We therefore hold that, absent consent, this search unreasonably intruded on Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights.[17]

C. Qualified Immunity

We now consider whether the Deputy Sheriffs are entitled to qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment issues. We conclude that they are not.

1. Liability for the Unreasonable Detention

[21] The deputies cannot receive qualified immunity for their unreasonably lengthy detention of Kulas and Padberg. The deputies' constitutional duty to act diligently and pursue a means of investigation likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly was clearly established on the date of the detention in this case. *See Sharpe*, 470 U.S. at 686. Moreover, it should

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[16] The Sheriff's Department also argues that the light switch was in plain view. That the switch was visible does not justify entry to flip the switch without some independent justification for entering the vehicle.

[17] To the extent consent existed for each search, we reject Plaintiffs' contention that the consent was not voluntary. "Whether consent to search was voluntarily given is 'to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.' " *United States v. Patayan Soriano*, 361 F.3d 494, 501 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting *Schneckloth v. Bustamonte*, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973)). We find nothing in the record that suggests coercion. The only factor militating against voluntariness is the deputies' failure to advise Kulas and Padberg of their right to refuse consent. This alone does not show that their consent was involuntary. *See Schneckloth*, 412 U.S. at 227.

have been readily apparent to a reasonable officer that § 626.8 provided no basis for a detention, as no violation of the statute occurred unless the Plaintiffs stayed on the premises after being asked to leave. It was also apparent that calling school liaison Deputy Sheriff Despot or Assistant Principal Roberts was not likely to quickly confirm or dispel any suspicion of wrongdoing. Moreover, neither Despot's nor Roberts's presence was necessary to enforce § 626.8. As the unlawfulness of their actions was apparent, the deputies are not entitled to qualified immunity. *See Hope*, 536 U.S. at 739.

2. Liability for Searches of the Security Vehicle

[22] Assuming Plaintiffs' allegations to be true, we conclude that the deputies do not have qualified immunity for the first search of the security vehicle. The deputies acted under authority given by California Vehicle Code § 2806, under which we have previously upheld warrantless searches of vehicles. *See Portillo*, 633 F.2d at 1318-19. *Portillo*, however, clearly warned that police may only search a vehicle under § 2806 when there is reasonable cause to believe inspection may uncover evidence of either potentially dangerous conditions or more serious code violations. *See id.* at 1319. Entering the vehicle to turn on the lights was not likely to provide information about either. Thus, the Sheriff's Deputies are not entitled to qualified immunity.

D. Summary of Fourth Amendment Claims

[23] Entry of summary judgment for the Sheriff's Department defendants was improper. The deputies

violated Plaintiffs' rights by unreasonably detaining them at the scene. Moreover, Plaintiffs have raised a genuine issue of material fact with regard to whether the deputies unlawfully entered their security vehicle. Finally, we conclude that the individual deputies are not entitled to qualified immunity on summary judgment. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment for Defendants on both Fourth Amendment claims. We also reverse the district court's denial of summary judgment for Plaintiffs on the unreasonable detention claim.

V. DISMISSAL OF SHERIFF BACA

We affirm the district court's dismissal of Sheriff Baca. An official capacity suit against a municipal officer is equivalent to a suit against the entity. *Kentucky v. Graham*, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985). When both a municipal officer and a local government entity are named, and the officer is named only in an official capacity, the court may dismiss the officer as a redundant defendant. *See Busby v. City of Orlando*, 931 F.2d 764, 776 (11th Cir. 1991). Thus, Sheriff Baca is a redundant defendant.[18]

VI. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Plaintiffs' First Amendment rights were violated. The individual

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[18] Plaintiffs argue that Baca is not a redundant defendant because the Sheriff's Department may have sovereign immunity. Plaintiffs, however, misstate the law: Local government entities do not have sovereign immunity. *Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.*, 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.54 (1978).

defendants, however, are entitled to qualified immunity from a damages action on this issue. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants and the denial of summary judgment for Plaintiffs on the First Amendment issue. We affirm the district court's dismissal of the damages action against the individual defendants on qualified immunity grounds on the First Amendment issue but remand for consideration of injunctive relief. We also affirm the district court's dismissal of Sheriff Baca.

We also hold that Plaintiffs have conclusively shown a violation of their Fourth Amendment rights because of the unreasonable length of Kulas and Padberg's detention. Moreover, Plaintiffs have raised a genuine issue of fact as to whether the Deputy Sheriffs unlawfully entered their security vehicle. We therefore reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment for Defendants on both Fourth Amendment claims and reverse the district court's denial of summary judgment for Plaintiffs on the unreasonable detention issue.

We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. In particular, we leave it to the district court to address, in light of this opinion, Plaintiffs' conspiracy claim and Plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED. EACH SIDE TO BEAR ITS OWN COSTS.

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case No. SACV 03-386-GLT (MLGx)

[Filed January 24, 2005]

CENTER FOR BIO-ETHICAL REFORM, INC. ET AL., Plaintiffs,	)
vs.	)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT ET AL., Defendants.	)

ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is DENIED. Defendants' motions for summary judgment are GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Paul Kulas and Thomas Padberg are volunteers for Plaintiff Center for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. In March 2003 Kulas drove a truck around Dodson

Middle School in Los Angeles County displaying on the side of the truck large graphic images of first-term aborted fetuses. Padberg followed Kulas in a car. Plaintiffs began circling the middle school at about 7:30 a.m. to get, according to them, the greatest exposure for their pictures. School officials and other individuals complained to Defendant Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department ("LACSD").

Approximately 30 minutes after Plaintiffs began circling, Sheriff's Deputies Darling and Repcik pulled Plaintiffs over. Darling and Repcik called Sergeant Aguilar and Deputy Despot to the scene. Despot also summoned Defendant Roberts, a school administrator. Plaintiffs were advised of California Penal Code section 626.8 pertaining to disrupting a school, were told they were disrupting the school and its students, and were ordered to leave the school area and not return with the graphic images. They left without incident.

Plaintiffs filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violation of their First and Fourth Amendment rights and conspiracy to deprive them of First Amendment rights.

On October 22, 2003, this Court found individual Defendants Aguilar, Despot, Darling, Repcik, and Roberts are entitled to qualified immunity and dismissed them in their individual capacity.[1] The

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[1] There is a question whether the Court granted the individuals qualified immunity on the First Amendment claim only, or on all claims. Because the Court now grants Defendants' motions for summary judgment on all claims, this issue is moot.

Court also dismissed Defendants Baca, Aguilar, Despot, Darling, and Repcik in their official capacity as redundant Defendants to LACSD. The Court denied Defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint as to LACSD and Defendant Roberts in his official capacity. The Court also denied Plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction.

Plaintiffs appealed the Court's October 22, 2003 ruling to the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed. All parties now move for summary judgment on all claims.

II. DISCUSSION

Summary judgment is proper if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact" and "the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

A. First Amendment and California Penal Code § 626.8

Plaintiffs were ordered to leave the streets adjacent to the school pursuant to California Penal Code section 626.8, which provides:

> Any person who comes into any school building or upon any school ground, or street, sidewalk, or public way adjacent thereto, without lawful business thereon, and whose presence or acts interfere with the peaceful conduct of the activities of the school or disrupt the school or its pupils or school activities . . . is guilty of a misdemeanor if he or she . . . . [r]emains there after being asked to leave by

> the chief administrative official of that school . . . or by a . . . sheriff or deputy sheriff . . . . This section shall not be utilized to impinge upon the lawful exercise of constitutionally protected rights of freedom of speech or assembly.

Cal. Penal Code § 626.8(a), (a)(1) (West 1999).

Plaintiffs claim application of this statute to their activities violated their First Amendment right to free speech.

1. "Lawful Business"

If Plaintiffs' activities were "lawful business," section 626.8 was improperly applied to them. Section 626.8 defines "lawful business" as "a reason for being present upon school property which is not otherwise prohibited by statute, by ordinance, or by any regulation adopted pursuant to statute or ordinance." Id. § 626.8(c)(2). Because Plaintiffs' act was prohibited by two state statutes, it was not lawful business under section 626.8.

California Education Code section 44811 states: "Any . . . person whose conduct in a place where a school employee is required to be in the course of his or her duties materially disrupts classwork or extracurricular activities or involves substantial disorder is guilty of a misdemeanor." Cal. Educ. Code § 44811(a). The undisputed facts show at least one class had to devote class time to discussing Plaintiffs' conduct. The deviation from the regular curriculum was a material disruption of the classwork.

The undisputed facts show Plaintiffs' conduct also caused substantial disorder at the school. First, two or three girls began crying after seeing the truck. (Pls.' Statement Uncontroverted Facts ¶ 77 [hereinafter "SUF"].) Second, 10-12 boys began planning to throw rocks at the truck. (Pls.' SUF ¶ 77.) Third, school administrators had difficulty getting the students from the area outside the school buildings into the classrooms, pursuant to school policy. (Roberts Dep. at 38:3-13.) Fourth, at least one class deviated from its regular curriculum to discuss Plaintiffs' conduct. (Pls.' Statement Genuine Issues ¶ 18 [hereinafter "SGI"].) These facts, taken together, show Plaintiffs' conduct caused substantial disorder at the school.[2] Plaintiffs' act violated section 44811.

California Education Code section 32210 provides: "Any person who willfully disturbs any public school . . . is guilty of a misdemeanor . . . ." Plaintiffs' disturbance was willful. They drove around the school from approximately 7:30 a.m. to 8:00 a.m., the time children typically arrive at school, in order to ensure the greatest exposure for the images on the truck. (Pls.' SGI ¶ 12.) They chose a middle school, where

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[2] Defendants also state up to five students left school before the end of the day because they were upset by Plaintiffs' images. It does not appear Roberts has personal knowledge of this fact. The fact is not in Roberts's Declaration. At the preliminary injunction hearing, Roberts testified the school counselors spoke to the children who left, but he did not speak to them. (Lehman Decl. Ex. 10 at 25:13-20.) Defendants do not present declarations of the school counselors or anyone who witnessed the children leaving. Defendants also do not present school records showing the children left early. The Court does not consider the fact in this ruling.

most children are between 11 and 13 years old. Plaintiff Kulas has observed children become upset by the images on prior occasions. Children have reacted by expressing disbelief, crying, fainting, experiencing physical illness, making obscene gestures at the truck, and throwing things at the truck. (Kulas Dep. at 70:18-71:20; Pls.' SGI ¶ 76.) Plaintiffs' act violated section 32210.

Because Plaintiffs' act was prohibited by state statutes, Plaintiffs did not have lawful business at the school.

2. Disruption

Penal Code section 626.8 also requires Plaintiffs' presence or acts to "interfere with the peaceful conduct of the activities of the school or disrupt the school or its pupils or school activities." As discussed above, Plaintiffs' truck did interfere with the peaceful conduct of the school and disrupted the school and its pupils.

3. Constitutionally Protected Speech

Section 626.8 may not be used "to impinge upon the lawful exercise of constitutionally protected rights of freedom of speech or assembly."

Expressive activity by members of the public may be prohibited on public sidewalks adjacent to school grounds if it "'materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.'" Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 118 (1972) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513)). Plaintiffs' expressive activity

materially disrupted classwork and involved substantial disorder at the school. Plaintiffs did not have a constitutional right to engage in their expressive activity on the public streets adjacent to the school.

The restriction on Plaintiffs' speech was constitutional if it was a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction that served a significant government interest, was narrowly tailored to advance that interest, and left open ample alternative channels of communication. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).

First, "[i]t is axiomatic that the government may not regulate speech based on its substantive content or the message it conveys." Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995). "The principal inquiry in determining content neutrality . . . is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys." Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.

Plaintiffs have not presented a genuine issue of material fact showing Defendants restricted Plaintiffs' speech based on the content of their message. The parties agree "LASD personnel and Art Roberts ordered Plaintiffs to stop their speech activity . . . because Plaintiffs' pictures were causing a reaction that they claimed was disruptive." (Pls.' SUF ¶ 50.) Roberts advised Plaintiffs their pictures were disruptive to the school and its students. (Pls.' SGI ¶ 59.) Plaintiffs were told to leave because of the disruption caused by the graphic pictures, not because

the pictures concerned abortion or because Defendants disagreed with Plaintiffs' viewpoint.[3]

The restriction on Plaintiffs' speech was a valid content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction. It furthered the significant government interest of having an "undisrupted school session conducive to the students' learning." Grayned, 408 U.S. at 119 (finding this a compelling interest). It was narrowly tailored to advance this interest. Plaintiffs were ordered to leave only the public streets adjacent to the school area and were not prohibited from driving their truck on other public streets. (Pls.' SGI ¶ 61.) Finally, it left open ample alternative channels of communication. Plaintiffs were not prohibited from conveying their

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[3] There would be a triable issue of fact as to whether the deputies initially responded to the scene because of the content of Plaintiffs' message. The log of the dispatcher's call states, "'Anti-abortion' truck with offensive language/pictures is circling the school and video taping the school and surrounding area." (Pls.' SUF Ex. 8 at 71:23-74:9 & Ex. 9.) However, this does not show Defendants told Plaintiffs to leave because of the content of the message.

Deputy Repcik wrote in his incident report, "due to the often volatile nature of the issue of abortion." (Repcik Dep. at 63:25-64:5.) This does not raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendants told Plaintiffs to leave because of the content of Plaintiffs' message. Repcik stated he wrote the phrase to document the volatile and emotional nature of the issue to explain why Plaintiffs' conduct caused a "very strong reaction from the children going to school." (Repcik Dep. at 63:25 - 65:21.) Deputy Repcik's testimony shows Defendants told Plaintiffs to leave because of the disruption, not because of the content or viewpoint of the images.

message in a nondisruptive manner or from going to any place other than the streets adjacent to the school.

B. Conspiracy Claim

Because there was no violation of Plaintiffs' First Amendment rights, Defendants cannot be liable for conspiracy to violate Plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916, 930 (9th Cir. 2004) ("[T]o state a claim for conspiracy under [42 U.S.C.] § 1985, a plaintiff must first have a cognizable claim under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983.").

C. Fourth Amendment Claim

Plaintiffs claim they were subjected to an unlawful search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment.

1. Seizure

"The Fourth Amendment prohibits 'unreasonable searches and seizures' by the Government, and its protections extend to brief investigatory stops of persons or vehicles that fall short of traditional arrest." United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). Here, the parties agree Plaintiffs were not free to leave during the stop. The detention was a "seizure" for Fourth Amendment purposes. Gallegos v. City of L.A., 308 F.3d 987, 990 (9th Cir. 2002).

The parties dispute whether Plaintiffs' detention was an investigatory stop or an arrest. During an investigatory stop, "the Fourth Amendment is satisfied if the officer's action is supported by reasonable

suspicion to believe that criminal activity may be afoot." Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273 (internal quotations omitted). A determination of reasonable suspicion must consider the totality of the circumstances, and it requires a lesser showing than that needed to find probable cause or a preponderance of evidence. Id.

If the detention qualifies as an arrest, Defendants must show the Deputies had probable cause to arrest Plaintiffs. Gallegos, 308 F.3d at 990. "There is no bright line rule for determining when an investigatory stop crosses the line and becomes an arrest." Id. at 991 (internal quotation omitted). The Court conducts a fact-specific inquiry of the totality of the circumstances, including how intrusive the stop was and whether the deputies' methods were reasonable given the circumstances. Id.

Many facts regarding the stop are not disputed. The stop took approximately 75 minutes. For some period of time, the deputies held Plaintiffs' driver's licenses. The deputies did not draw their guns, handcuff Plaintiffs, tell Plaintiffs they were under arrest, or place Plaintiffs in a patrol car. Plaintiffs were able to walk around the general area, talk to each other, obtain a notepad to take notes, and call their boss.

Given the totality of the circumstances, this was an investigatory stop, not an arrest. The stop was not substantially intrusive, and the deputies' methods were reasonable. See id. at 991-92 (finding a detention was an investigatory stop rather than an arrest even when police pulled their guns on the suspect,

handcuffed him, placed him in the patrol car, and took him to the police station).

To justify the investigatory stop, Defendants must show the deputies had a reasonable suspicion to believe criminal activity may be afoot. Plaintiffs do not seriously contest, and it appears to the Court, the deputies had a reasonable suspicion. They were responding to a call about a truck displaying anti-abortion images, with a video camera, circling a school. See United States v. Terry-Crespo, 356 F.3d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding a sufficiently reliable 911 call supported a reasonable suspicion justifying an investigatory stop). The call provided them a reasonable basis to suspect Plaintiffs were disturbing the school or engaging in other unlawful activity. When the deputies located Plaintiffs, they believed Plaintiffs' car looked similar to a police car. This gave them a reasonable suspicion Plaintiffs' car was intended to mimic a police car.

Plaintiffs argue the length of the stop was unconstitutionally long. The length of time is an important factor in determining whether the stop was as minimally intrusive as necessary to justify a reasonable suspicion. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985). To determine minimal intrusiveness, the Court takes into account "the law enforcement purposes to be served by the stop as well as the time reasonably needed to effectuate those purposes." Id. However, the length is not determinative. See id. ("[O]ur cases impose no rigid time limitation" on investigatory stops).

Here, the law enforcement purposes served by the stop were primarily to prevent further disruption at the school and to evaluate whether Plaintiffs' follow car was lawful.[4] The first responding deputies called their supervisor, Sergeant Aguilar, to the scene because they were not familiar with the appropriate course of action in the situation. Once Aguilar arrived, they called Deputy Despot, the liaison with Dodson Middle School. These steps were reasonably needed to ensure an appropriate response to Plaintiffs' conduct while preventing further disturbance at the school. The record shows it took between 45 and 60 minutes for Aguilar and Despot to arrive.

Deputy Despot brought Roberts, the assistant principal of the school, to the scene to explain the situation to Plaintiffs. This was reasonably necessary to ensure no further disruption at the school. The record shows Roberts arrived an hour or more after the stop.

Plaintiffs present no evidence of delay in calling Aguilar, Despot, or Roberts to the scene. There also is no evidence these individuals delayed coming to the scene after they were called. The time it took for these individuals to arrive was as minimally intrusive as necessary.

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[4] The vehicle was a Crown Victoria with outside spotlights, a push bar on the front bumper, an antenna mounted on the roof and trunk, red and amber flashing lights, a security cage separating the rear seat, and a video camera mounted on the dashboard. The parties do not dispute the deputies initially believed the vehicle may not have been lawful because it looked similar to a police car, but ultimately determined it to be a lawful security vehicle.

During the investigatory stop, the deputies checked Plaintiffs' license plates and identifications and investigated whether Plaintiffs' security vehicle violated any laws, which included contacting a traffic investigator to research the legality of the vehicle's equipment. The record does not show the deputies delayed these investigatory tasks.

The deputies diligently pursued a course of investigation "likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly." Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686. Seventy-five minutes was reasonably needed to effectuate the purposes of the stop. See Gallegos, 308 F.3d at 992 (finding 45-60 minutes was not an unreasonable length of time to drive to and from the police station and wait for a supervising officer to arrive, when the suspect was not handcuffed or in the police car the whole time).

2. Search

Plaintiffs contend two events constituted unlawful searches. First, without obtaining Plaintiffs' consent, Deputy Repcik entered the "security vehicle" car, looked for the switch for the flashing lights, and turned on the lights.

The parties presented no legal authority on this issue. The Court finds Repcik's act was not an unlawful search.

> Automobiles, unlike homes, are subjected to pervasive and continuing governmental regulation and controls, including periodic inspection and licensing requirements. As an

> everyday occurrence, police stop and examine vehicles when license plates or inspection stickers have expired, or if other violations, such as exhaust fumes or excessive noise, are noted, or if headlights or other safety equipment are not in proper working order.

South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976).

"The privacy interests in an automobile are constitutionally protected; however, . . . the ready mobility of the automobile justifies a lesser degree of protection of those interests." California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985). Also, "because the passenger compartment of a standard automobile is relatively open to plain view, there are lesser expectations of privacy." Id. at 391.

Here, Repcik's inspection of the "security vehicle" car was reasonable. The deputies believed the vehicle looked similar to a police car and may have violated the Vehicle Code. Plaintiffs' vehicle was readily mobile. The switch in the passenger compartment was relatively open to plain view. Entering the vehicle to turn on the lights was necessary to assess the vehicle's features to determine if it violated the Vehicle Code.

Second, Plaintiffs argue their consent to the deputies' later search of the car was not free and voluntary. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983) ("[T]he State has the burden of proving that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given . . . ."). Whether consent is voluntary is "a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances." Schneckloth v.

Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973). Voluntary consent may not be "coerced, by explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert force." Id. at 228.

Defendants have shown there is no evidence in the record of explicit or implicit coercion, threats, or force. Plaintiffs do not identify any such evidence. Plaintiffs did not have to know they could refuse consent in order for the consent to be valid. Id. at 248-49. The consent was voluntarily given. The valid consent waived Plaintiffs' right to object to the search. Id. at 235.

Plaintiffs also contend they were arrested, which precludes voluntary consent. Having found Plaintiffs were not arrested, this argument fails.

D. Injunctive Relief and Nominal Damages

Because Plaintiffs do not prevail on their civil rights claims, injunctive relief and nominal damages are not warranted.

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III. DISPOSITION

Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is DENIED. Defendants' motions for summary judgment are GRANTED.

DATED: January 24, 2005.

/s/
GARY L. TAYLOR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

No. SACV 03-386

[Filed April 17, 2003]

CENTER FOR BIO-ETHICAL REFORM, INC., PAUL KULAS, and **THOMAS PADBERG,** Plaintiffs,	)
v.	)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT ("LACSD"), LEROY D. BACA, in his official capacity as Sheriff, LACSD, **XAVIER R. AGUILAR,** individually and in his official capacity as Sergeant, LACSD, **DAVE DESPOT,** individually and in his official capacity as Deputy, LACSD, **MARK DARLING,** individually and in his official capacity as Deputy, LACSD, **MARK C. REPCIK,** individually and in his official capacity as Deputy, LACSD, and **ART ROBERTS,** individually and in his official capacity as an administrative official, Dodson Middle School,	)

Defendants.)
)

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES, DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Plaintiffs, by and through their undersigned attorneys, bring this Complaint against the above-named Defendants, their employees, agents, and successors in office, and in support thereof allege the following upon information and belief:

JURISDICTION

1. This action arises under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3).

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT

2. This is a case asserting the fundamental constitutional rights of Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs are pro-life advocates who engage in lawful expressive activity in the State of California and elsewhere to protest abortion and to promote respect for human life. This is a civil rights action challenging the acts of Defendants and the constitutionality of California Penal Code § 626.8 (hereinafter referred to as "Section 626.8") as applied to Plaintiffs' pro-life activities. (A true and correct copy of Section 626.8 is attached to this Complaint as Exhibit A and is incorporated herein by reference). According to Defendants, Section 626.8

prohibits Plaintiffs from engaging in their pro-life activities on the public streets adjacent to a public school.

3. Plaintiffs seek a declaration that Section 626.8, as applied, is unconstitutional and a permanent injunction enjoining its enforcement as applied against Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs seek nominal damages against certain Defendants for the past loss of their constitutional rights. And Plaintiffs seek an award of reasonable costs of litigation, including attorneys' fees and expenses, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

4. Plaintiffs' claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are authorized by 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202, by Rules 57 and 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and by the general legal and equitable powers of this Court. Plaintiffs' claim for damages is authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

5. Plaintiffs' prayer for relief regarding costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees, is authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

6. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiffs' claims occurred in this district.

PLAINTIFFS

7. Plaintiff Center for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. ("CBR"), is a pro-life, California-based, non-profit corporation. It is a section 501(c)(3) organization that is incorporated under the laws of the State of California.

8. Plaintiff Paul Kulas is an adult resident of the State of California and a citizen of the United States. Plaintiff Kulas is a full-time employee of CBR.

9. Plaintiff Thomas Padberg is an adult resident of the State of California and a citizen of the United States. Plaintiff Padberg is a CBR volunteer.

DEFENDANTS

10. Defendant Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department ("LACSD") is a public entity capable of being sued. LACSD, through its agents, enforces Section 626.8 throughout the Los Angeles County.

11. Defendant Leroy D. Baca is the Sheriff for LACSD. He is responsible for enforcing Section 626.8. At all relevant times, Defendant Baca was an agent, servant, and/or employee of LACSD, acting under color of state law as that phrase is used in 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendant Baca is sued in his official capacity only.

12. Defendant Xavier R. Aguilar is a Sergeant with LACSD. At all relevant times, Defendant Aguilar was an agent, servant, and/or employee of LACSD, acting under color of state law as that phrase is used in 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendant Aguilar is sued individually and in his official capacity.

13. Defendant Dave Despot is a Deputy with LACSD. At all relevant times, Defendant Despot was an agent, servant, and/or employee of LACSD, acting under color of state law as that phrase is used in 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendant Despot is sued individually and in his official capacity.

14. Defendant Mark Darling is a Deputy with LACSD. At all relevant times, Defendant Darling was an agent, servant, and/or employee of LACSD, acting under color of state law as that phrase is used in 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendant Darling is sued individually and in his official capacity.

15. Defendant Mark C. Repcik is a Deputy with LACSD. At all relevant times, Defendant Repcik was an agent, servant, and/or employee of LACSD, acting under color of state law as that phrase is used in 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendant Repcik is sued individually and in his official capacity.

16. Defendant Art Roberts is an administrative official at the Dodson Middle School, a public school located in Los Angeles County, California. At all relevant times, Defendant Roberts was an agent, servant, chief administrative official, designated representative of a chief administrative official, and/or employee of the Dodson Middle School, serving a public function, acting jointly and in a symbiotic relationship with Defendants, and acting under color of state law as that phrase is used in 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

17. CBR was established in 1990 as a non-profit public policy and advocacy group to promote prenatal justice and the right to life for the unborn, the disabled, the infirm, the aged, and all vulnerable peoples through education and the development of innovative educational programs. One such educational program is the Reproductive Choice Campaign ("RCC").

18. The RCC consists of large, colorful pictures depicting graphic images of first-term aborted fetuses displayed on the sides of box body style trucks. The pictures on the sides of the trucks are accurately captioned as to age, in weeks since fertilization. True and accurate photographs of an RCC truck are attached to this Complaint as Exhibits B, C, and D.

19. Plaintiffs' pictures are not solicitations or commercial speech; they are political speech. The purpose of this educational program is to expose as many people as possible to the reality of abortion, particularly first-term abortions. The RCC demonstrates to onlookers that abortion is a violent act that results in the killing of innocent human life and is, therefore, contrary to the common good. Plaintiffs express their pro-life message by displaying these pictures in public areas throughout the Los Angeles County and elsewhere.

20. Plaintiffs engage in this educational program on the public streets and public ways adjacent to middle schools and high schools throughout Los Angeles County and elsewhere because there are students at these schools who have either had or are contemplating having an abortion without being informed about the truth or reality of abortion and, in many cases, without informing their parents of their plans to have an abortion or seeking their parents' consent prior to obtaining an abortion. In some cases, students are excused from class, taken to an abortion facility, receive an abortion, and return to class without parental notification or consent. CBR believes that students who are old enough to have an abortion are old enough to see one.

21. On or about March 24, 2003, Plaintiffs were traveling the public streets adjacent to the Dodson Middle School in Los Angeles County, California as part of Plaintiffs' RCC activities. Plaintiff Kulas was driving an RCC truck, which displayed the graphic images of aborted babies. Plaintiff Padberg was driving an escort vehicle, a Ford Crown Victoria sedan. Altogether, two vehicles were involved in Plaintiffs' pro-life speech activity on this day.

22. Plaintiffs commenced their pro-life speech activity on the adjacent public streets of the Dodson Middle School at or about 7:30 a.m. Plaintiffs chose this time because it would ensure the greatest exposure for their pictures.

23. Plaintiffs were driving their vehicles on the public streets adjacent to the Dodson Middle School, circling the area just outside of the school grounds, for approximately thirty minutes when Defendant Darling arrived in his marked police vehicle. Several minutes later, Defendant Repcik arrived in a second marked police vehicle, turned on his flashing lights, and pulled over the Plaintiffs. Both police vehicles pulled up behind the Plaintiffs' vehicles, which had now pulled over to the side of the road. School officials at Dodson Middle School and others had made complaints to LACSD, seeking to prevent Plaintiffs from displaying their graphic pictures.

24. Defendant Darling approached Plaintiff Kulas, who was sitting in the RCC truck, and demanded that he produce his driver's license and exit the vehicle. Plaintiff Kulas asked Defendant Darling why he had been stopped, and Defendant Darling stated, "You are

driving this truck around with graphic images and offensive language and scaring the kids," or words to that effect. Plaintiff Kulas surrendered his driver's license and exited his vehicle as requested.

25. Defendant Repcik approached Plaintiff Padberg and told him that he could charge him with a "sex crime" because displaying the pictures was "child abuse," or words to that effect. Defendant Repcik demanded that Plaintiff Padberg produce his driver's license and exit the vehicle. Plaintiff Padberg complied with the demands.

26. Defendants Darling and Repcik conferred for several minutes and then called for their Sergeant. At approximately 8:45 a.m., Defendant Aguilar arrived in a marked police vehicle. Defendants Darling, Repcik, and Aguilar conferred for several minutes. Defendant Despot then arrived on the scene in a marked police vehicle. It was clear to Plaintiffs that Defendants were devising a way to charge Plaintiffs with a violation of the law.

27. Defendant Despot approached Plaintiffs and asked them questions about the escort sedan. Defendant Despot took several photographs of the sedan. Defendant Repcik then entered the sedan without requesting or receiving permission to do so. Defendant Repcik began searching the sedan and eventually turned on the vehicle's lights.

28. Defendants Repcik and Despot scoured the sedan looking for a violation of the law. They could not find one.

29. Defendant Despot then entered his police vehicle and departed for the Dodson Middle School, returning several minutes later with Defendant Roberts.

30. Defendant Despot escorted Defendant Roberts over to Plaintiffs. Defendant Roberts, who was coached by the Defendant deputies, told Plaintiffs that their pictures were disruptive and that they had to leave the area and not return. Defendant Roberts was willingly working with the other Defendants to achieve the objective of preventing Plaintiffs from displaying their graphic pictures on the public streets adjacent to the Dodson Middle School. Defendant Darling advised Plaintiffs of the content of Section 626.8, reading verbatim portions of this penal code. Defendants told Plaintiffs that they have been informed pursuant to Section 626.8, and they must now leave and not return with their graphic pictures.

31. Because of Defendants' credible threat to enforce Section 626.8, which carries penalties of a fine and imprisonment, Plaintiffs departed the area and will not return to continue their pro-life speech activity.

32. At no time did Plaintiffs come into any school building or upon any of the school grounds of the Dodson Middle School. Plaintiffs' pro-life speech activity was confined to the public streets adjacent to the Dodson Middle School.

33. The Defendants detained Plaintiffs for more than one and a half hours before releasing them.

STATUTORY FRAMEWORK OF SECTION 626.8

34. Section 626.8 states, in relevant part: "Any person who comes into any school building or upon any school ground, or street, sidewalk, or public way adjacent thereto, without lawful business thereon, and whose presence or acts interfere with the peaceful conduct of the activities of the school or disrupt the school or its pupils or school activities . . . is guilty of a misdemeanor if he or she does any of the following: (1) Remains there after being asked to leave by the chief administrative official of that school or his or her designated representative, or by . . . [a] sheriff or deputy sheriff. . . . (2) reenters or comes upon that place within seven days of being asked to leave by a person specified in paragraph (1)."

35. "This section shall not be utilized to impinge upon the lawful exercise of constitutionally protected rights of freedom of speech or assembly."

36. "(b) Punishment for violation of this section shall be as follows: (1) Upon a first conviction by a fine of not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500), by imprisonment in the county jail for a period of not more than six months, or by both the fine and imprisonment."

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF (Freedom of Speech)

37. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference all above paragraphs.

38. By reason of the aforementioned acts and omissions, engaged in under color of state law, Defendants have unconstitutionally deprived Plaintiffs of their freedom of speech rights guaranteed under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution as applied to the states and their political subdivisions under the Fourteenth Amendment, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in that by enforcing and/or applying Section 626.8 against Plaintiffs' pro-life speech activity, Defendants have prevented Plaintiffs from expressing their opposition to abortion in a public forum.

39. By reason of the aforementioned acts and omissions, engaged in under the color of state law, Defendants have also unconstitutionally deprived Plaintiffs of their freedom of speech rights guaranteed to them under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, as applied to the states and their political subdivisions under the Fourteenth Amendment, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in that Defendants, through their acts, policies, practices, and/or customs, unlawfully and unreasonably detained and searched Plaintiffs because of their pro-life speech activity.

40. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' violation of Plaintiffs' rights, Plaintiffs have suffered direct and irreparable injury, and they are entitled to damages.

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Freedom of Speech Conspiracy)

41. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference all above paragraphs.

42. By reason of the aforementioned acts and omissions, and policies, practices, and/or customs, engaged in under the color of state law Defendants have conspired to unconstitutionally deprive Plaintiffs of their right to freedom of speech guaranteed under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution as applied to the states and their political subdivisions under the Fourteenth Amendment, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in that Defendants agreed to and engaged in overt acts that prevented Plaintiffs from expressing their opposition to abortion in a public forum.

43. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' violation of Plaintiffs' rights, Plaintiffs have suffered direct and irreparable injury, and they are entitled to damages.

THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Unlawful Search and Seizure)

44. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference all above paragraphs.

45. By reason of the aforementioned acts and omissions, and policies, practices, and/or customs, engaged in under the color of state law, Defendant Repcik unconstitutionally searched Plaintiffs' vehicle and Defendants Aguilar, Despot, Darling, and Repcik unconstitutionally seized Plaintiffs' persons, vehicles, and other property, without a warrant, without probable cause that a crime had been, was being, or would be committed, and without valid consent, and thus deprived Plaintiffs of their rights to be free of unreasonable police searches and seizures, to be free

of warrantless searches and seizures, and to be free of searches and seizures without probable cause, which are guaranteed to them under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as applied to the states and their political subdivisions under the Fourteenth Amendment, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

46. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' violation of Plaintiffs' rights, Plaintiffs have suffered direct and irreparable injury, and they are entitled to damages.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs ask this Court:

A) to enjoin Defendants, their employees, agents, and successors in office from enforcing Section 626.8 as applied against Plaintiffs' pro-life speech activity as described herein;

B) to enter judgment declaring that the application of Section 626.8 to Plaintiffs' pro-life speech activity as described herein violates Plaintiffs' constitutional rights;

C) to award Plaintiffs nominal damages against Defendants Aguilar, Despot, Darling, Repcik, and Roberts in their individual capacities for the past loss of Plaintiffs' constitutional rights;

D) to award Plaintiffs their reasonable attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and other applicable law;

E) to grant such other and further relief as this Court should find just and proper.

Respectfully submitted this 11th day of April, 2003.

THOMAS MORE LAW CENTER

By: /s/
Robert J. Muise *
*Subject to admission *pro hac vice*

ASHWORTH, HAYES & MORAN, LLP

By: /s/
James A. Hayes, Jr., Esq.
Counsel for Plaintiffs

EXHIBIT A

§ 626.8. Disruptive presence at schools; specified sex offenders; offenses; punishment: notification

(a) Any person who comes into any school building or upon any school ground, or street, sidewalk, or public way adjacent thereto, without lawful business thereon, and whose presence or acts interfere with the peaceful conduct of the activities of the school or disrupt the school or its pupils or school activities, or any specified sex offender who comes into any school building or upon any school ground, or street, sidewalk, or public way adjacent thereto, unless the person is a parent or guardian of a child attending that school, or is a student at the school or has prior written permission for the entry from the chief administrative officer of that school, is guilty of a misdemeanor if he or she does any of the following:

(1) Remains there after being asked to leave by the chief administrative official of that school or his or her designated representative, or by a person employed as a member of a security or police department of a school district pursuant to Section 39670 of the Education Code, or a city police officer, or sheriff or deputy sheriff, or a Department of the California Highway Patrol peace officer.

(2) Reenters or comes upon that place within seven days of being asked to leave by a person specified in paragraph (1).

(3) Has otherwise established a continued pattern of unauthorized entry.

This section shall not be utilized to impinge upon the lawful exercise of constitutionally protected rights of freedom of speech or assembly.

(b) Punishment for violation of this section shall be as follows:

(1) Upon a first conviction by a fine of not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500), by imprisonment in the county jail for a period of not more than six months, or by both the fine and imprisonment.

(2) If the defendant has been previously convicted once of a violation of any offense defined in this chapter or Section 415.5, by imprisonment in the county jail for a period of not less than 10 days or more than six months, or by both imprisonment and a fine of not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500), and shall not be released on probation, parole, or any other basis until he or she has served not less than 10 days.

(3) If the defendant has been previously convicted two or more times of a violation of any offense defined in this chapter or Section 415.5, by imprisonment in the county jail for a period of not less than 90 days or more than six months, or by both imprisonment and a fine of not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500), and shall not be released on probation, parole, or any other basis until he or she has served not less than 90 days.

(c) As used in this section, the following definitions govern the meaning of the following words and phrases:

(1) "Specified sex offender" means any person required to register pursuant to Section 290, who has been convicted of a violation of Section 220, 261, 266, 267, 272, 288, or 289, or of subdivision (c), (d), or (f) of Section 286, or of subdivision (c), (d), or (f) of Section 288a, or of an attempt to commit any of these offenses.

(2) "Lawful business" means a reason for being present upon school property which is not otherwise prohibited by statute, by ordinance, or by any regulation adopted pursuant to statute or ordinance.

(3) "Continued pattern of unauthorized entry" means that on at least two prior occasions in the same school year the defendant came into any school building or upon any school ground, or street, sidewalk, or public way adjacent thereto, without lawful business thereon, and his or her presence or acts interfered with the peaceful conduct of the activities of the school or disrupted the school or its pupils or school activities, and the defendant was asked to leave by a person specified in paragraph (1) of subdivision (a).

(4) In the case of a specified sex offender, "continued pattern of unauthorized entry" means that on at least two prior occasions in the same school year the defendant came into any school building or upon any school ground, or street, sidewalk, or public way adjacent thereto, and the defendant was asked to leave by a person specified in paragraph (1) of subdivision (a).

(5) "School" means any preschool or school having any of grades kindergarten through 12.

(d) When a person is directed to leave pursuant to paragraph (1) of subdivision (a), the person directing him or her to leave shall inform the person that if he or she reenters the place within seven days he or she will be guilty of a crime.

EXHIBIT B



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EXHIBIT C

EXHIBIT D